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Abstract 
 
Nonfinancial defined contribution (NDC) pension systems have recently become popular 
because they provide the strong incentives of the private funded systems without requiring a 
difficult transition period. Using the framework of mechanism design, these systems have 
theoretically been criticized because they neglect the regressive intracohort redistribution: 
longer lived workers retire later and are rewarded as if their life expectancies were average. 
Now we document this by Hungarian data, and giving up the framework of mechanism 
design, we corroborate our earlier qualitative findings withthe more realistic benefit 
adjustment function and wage heterogeneity. 
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Korosztályon belüli regresszív újraelosztás az eszmei 
nyugdíjszámlájú nyugdíjrendszerben 
 
András Simonovits  
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az eszmei nyugdíjszámlájú nyugdíjrendszerek mostanában nagyon népszerűvé váltak, mert 
a nélkül teremtették meg a tőkésített magánnyugdíj-rendszerek erős ösztönzőit, hogy 
szükség lett volna a nehéz átmeneti időszakra. A mechanizmustervezés keretét alkalmazva 
elméletileg bíráltuk ezeket a rendszereket, mert elhanyagolták a korosztályon belüli 
regresszív újraelosztást: a hosszabb életűek később mennek nyugdíjba és úgy jutalmazzák 
őket, mintha a várható élettartamuk átlagos lenne. A tanulmányban magyar adatokkal 
dokumentáljuk a kontraszelekciót és – feladva a mechanizmustervezést – megerősítjük 
korábbi kvalitatív eredményeinket reálisabb járadékigazítási függvénnyel és heterogén 
keresetekkel.   
 
Tárgyszavak: eszmei nyugdíjszámla, változó nyugdíjba vonulás, kontraszelekció, 
biztosításmatematikai méltányosság 
 
JEL kódok: C61, C63, D82, D91, H55 
 
1. Introduction
NDC is an acronym for nonfinancial (or earlier: notional) defined contribution and it
refers to newly introduced pension systems, where an unfunded system mimics a funded
one without suffering from the costly transition period. The basic idea of the NDC
scheme is paying a life annuity: the annual pension benefit is calculated as the ratio of
the stock of accumulated nonfinancial contributions and the remaining life expectancy.
This allows for variable (flexible) retirement age: those, who want to retire before/after
reaching the full benefit retirement age, receive a properly reduced/increased annual
benefit. (This principle of the so-called actuarially fair adjustment or delayed retirement
credit is applied well beyond the NDC scheme, notably in the very progressive US Social
Security system. N.B. A progressive scheme redistributes income from the rich to the
poor.) If workers only differed in their labor disutilities or in the dates of claiming their
benefits, then the NDC scheme would provide perfect incentives, maximize social welfare
and ensure the balance between revenues and expenditures (Holzmann and Palmer, 2006
and Holzmann, Palmer and Robalino, 2012). (The impact of delayed claiming social
security benefits was analyzed theoretically as well as empirically by Coile, Diamond,
Gruber and Jousten (2002).)
A lot of researchers have underlined that—apart from differences between males and
females—life expectancy is strongly and positively correlated with the lifetime average
earnings. Therefore under tight link between lifetime contributions and annual benefits,
there is a hidden regressive lifetime redistribution from the poorer to the richer (e.g.
Breyer and Hupfeld, 2009). Kre´mer (2012) observed that the quite unequal distribution
of the Hungarian entry pensions becomes quite equal in the distribution of all pensions
partly because pensioners with low benefits die much earlier than the others. (The other
part of this discrepancy is caused by the slow phasing-out of earlier granted progressive
benefits.) Similarly, Dive´nyi and Ke´zdi (2012) proved empirically that the poor health
status of the Hungarian population above 50 years is one important cause of the low
old-age employment and by implication, of low but heterogeneous life expectancies.
The proponents of the NDC scheme have discussed several problems of intercohort
redistribution of NDC, most notably, how to choose the fictitious interest rate and the
remaining life expectancy under rising life expectancy and sinking fertility (for a fresh
analysis, see Knell (2012).) Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) on disability retire-
ment, another group of analysts have criticized the regressive intracohort redistribution
in the NDC scheme, or more generally, in actuarial fair adjustment in old-age pensions:
Fabel (1994), Eso˝ and Simonovits (2002), Diamond (2003, Chapter 7), Cremer, Lozach-
meur and Pestieau (2004), Simonovits (2006), Sheshinski (2008), Bommier, Leroux
and Lozachmeur (2011) and Eso˝, Simonovits and To´th (2011). Their common start-
ing point has been the obvious observation that actuarially fair adjustment (especially
NDC) neglects the regressive redistribution caused by adverse selection: expectedly
longer/shorter lived retire later/earlier and rewarded/punished as if the whole cohort
had a common stochastic lifespan—regressive redistribution.
For technical reasons, modeling the socially optimal design, most of the above-
mentioned critical writings assumed common earnings and our papers used a primitive
adjustment formula, neglecting the possibility that early death may precede late retire-
ment. Among authors allowing for that complication, Diamond (2003) restricted his
analysis to the choice between minimal and maximal retirement ages, while Sheshinski
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(2008) discussed learning the survival curve. Furthermore, there were very few data
to substantiate our theoretical findings. For whatever reason, the proponents of the
NDC scheme have hardly noticed lest accepted our critique on excessive intracohort
redistribution.
In this paper our earlier critique of NDC is revisited and extended to other pension
systems. First, nationwide Hungarian data are presented on all those old-age pension-
ers who deceased in 2004 (unpublished work of Judit Marosi and Rudolf Borlo´i). Even
though there were very weak incentives to postpone retirement and quite strong incen-
tives to early retirement, there was a very strong adverse selection in the period closed
in 2004. To give just one data on adverse selection: males aged 65 had a remaining
life expectancy 13.1 years, while those who retired at age 65 lived on average a sur-
prisingly long period of 24.3 years. Second, giving up the mathematically sophisticated
mechanism design approach, and incorporating Banya´r (2011)’s critique on our earlier
formulation, now the original primitive NDC adjustment rule is replaced by a realistic
one. (I do not follow him, however, in his transformation of the NDC scheme into a
minimum flat scheme.) Under plausible assumptions, the NDC scheme is still unbal-
anced, i.e. the average revenues are much lower than the average expenditures are.
Furthermore, the lifetime balances keep decreasing with life expectancies.
Third, the category of regular benefit–retirement age schedules is introduced and the
inevitability of regressive redistribution is also proved. Artificial numerical examples
illustrate the analytical theorems. For example, using a 30 percent contribution rate,
and eliminating an aggregate deficit about 2.5-year total wage, our balanced NDC scheme
punishes the shortest lived (who died at 63) and lowest paid by 5.1-year own wage! On
the other hand, the longest lived (who died at 93) and highest paid is rewarded by
9-year own wage! In the compressed NDC scheme, the lifetime balances are still large in
absolute values and decreasing with the life expectancies but much compressed, starting
from 2.6-year surplus and ending with 3.8-year deficit.
It is to be underlined that in the present approach, the mortality rates are given
exogeneously and are independent of the retirement age and the benefit. In reality,
however, the meaningful work lengthens the lifespan and the increased benefits make
room for better health care and longer lives.
The approach also neglects the very important gender differentials, though males
earn much more and die much earlier than females do. Copying the practice of public
pensions, we use a unisex framework, weakening the positive correlation between lifetime
earnings and life expectancies, prevailing for males and females separately.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 displays the
Hungarian data on adverse selection. Section 3 analyzes the actuarial pitfalls of the
NDC system, while Section 4 proves the inevitability of some regressive redistribution
for any regular scheme. Section 5 contains numerical illustrations on the balanced and
the compressed NDC system and Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
We present Tables 1 and 2 contrasting the remaining life expectancies with the expected
pension span of all Hungarian male and female old-age pensioners who died in 2004.
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We shall see the adverse selection mentioned in the Introduction. Rows with erstwhile
full benefit retirement age (60 for males and 55 for females) are italicized.
Table 1. Expected lifespan and retirement age, male, years
Expected Remaining
Life Retirement Relative pension life Estimation
expectancy age frequency span expectancy error
L+DR L+R 100fR D −R MR SR
69.3 57 7.4% 12.3 18.0 5.7
71.5 58 6.0% 13.5 17.3 3.8
73.2 59 4.6% 14.2 16.7 2.5
77.2 60 60.5% 17.2 16.1 –1.1
79.1 61 12.7% 18.1 16.4 –1.7
82.9 62 3.9% 20.9 14.9 –6.0
85.4 63 2.1% 22.4 14.3 –8.1
86.4 64 1.6% 23.4 13.7 –9.7
89.3 65 1.4% 24.3 13.1 –11.2
Remarks. L = 20, SR = DR −R−MR. Number of observations: 28.5 thousands.
Table 2. Expected lifespan and retirement age, female, years
Expected Remaining
Life Retirement Relative pension life Estimation
expectancy age frequency span expectancy error
L+DR L+R 100fR D −R MR SR
66.8 52 2.3% 14.8 27.4 12.6
68.8 53 2.0% 15.8 26.6 10.8
73.7 54 2.3% 19.7 25.7 6.0
75.7 55 46.2% 20.7 24.9 4.2
79.6 56 16.8% 23.6 24.1 0.5
81.3 57 7.9% 24.3 23.3 –1.0
82.7 58 5.9% 24.7 22.5 –2.2
84.4 59 4.0% 25.4 21.7 –3.7
86.7 60 4.3% 26.7 20.9 –5.8
86.6 61 2.6% 25.6 20.1 –5.5
86.5 62 2.0% 24.5 19.3 –5.2
86.5 63 1.7% 23.5 18.5 –5.0
87.0 64 1.0% 23.0 17.7 –5.3
86.5 65 1.0% 21.5 16.9 –4.6
Remarks. L = 20, SR = DR −R−MR. Number of observations: 30.3 thousands.
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Note that our statistical data are quite rudimentary, they do not distinguish be-
tween survival profiles of subsequent cohorts. Nevertheless, I am convinced that they
correctly reflect the adverse selection. We start the presentation with explaining column
2, classifying the deceased according to their retirement ages between 57 (52) and 65 for
males (females). Column 3 contains the relative frequencies of these groups. Column 4
is the most interesting one, depicting the expected retirement span as a function of the
retirement age. Adding up the columns 2 and 4 yields the life expectancy, displayed in
column 1. In contrast to males, females retiring above age 59 appear to differ only in
their labor disutilities but not in their life expectancies. Column 5 contains the usual
remaining (average) life expectancies, regardless of the retirement status. Column 6
displays the estimation error of government, being the signed difference of columns 4
and 5. Note that for males, the estimation error drops from 5.7 (at retirement age 57)
to –11.2 years (at 65), while for females, the change is from 12.6 (at age 52) to –4.6
years (at age 65).
3. A critique of the NDC scheme
Having presented the data, we work out the model to criticize the NDC scheme, com-
paring symmetric information and asymmetric information. For convenience, we neglect
childhood: L = 0, hence the type-specific adult retirement age and the length of em-
ployment are equal. We assume that the population is stationary, there is neither
inflation nor personal income taxation (for an exception, Cremer et al., 2004). We
also assume that the government knows the probability distribution of lifespans. Every
worker chooses his retirement age (i.e. when he stops working and claims the benefit)
depending on his life expectancy, consumption utilities and labor disutility. In harmony
with the practice of public pension systems, there is no sex discrimination.
Symmetric information
Following the proponents of the NDC system, we start our analysis with the assumption
of symmetric information: the government and the workers have the same stochastic
information on lifespans (more realistically, life expectancies).
Let fi be the probability of death at age i, for i = α, . . . , ω;
∑ω
i=α fi = 1, α being the
earliest age what is relevant for old-age retirement, while ω is the maximal life span. We
define the remaining (average) life expectancy of aged a, where a is a positive integer:
Ma =
∑ω
i=a+1 fi(i− a)∑ω
i=a+1 fi
, a = α, . . . , ω − 1. (1a)
We shall assume thatMa is decreasing but the decrease is limited: Ma > Ma+1 ≥Ma−1.
We shall need the intermediate values to be defined by linear interpolation. Let A
be a positive real number and a = [A] be its integer part, while {A} be its fractional
part, i.e. A = a+ {A}. Then the generalized remaining life expectancy is
M(A) = (1− {A})Ma + {A}Ma+1. (1b)
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Note that M(A) is continuous and decreasing.
We assume that a worker earns a positive annual wage w during his active lifetime.
Thus a worker retiring at age R has accumulated a nonfinancial pension wealth τRw,
yielding an annual NDC benefit
bN (R) =
τRw
M(R)
. (2)
Note that delaying retirement by one year raises the numerator and decreases the de-
nominator, thus doubly raises the annual benefit!
Then, regardless of the value of the retirement age R, his expected lifetime (pension)
balance is zero:
zN (R) = τRw −M(R)bN (R) = 0. (3)
We can also consider another symmetric case, when both the government and the
workers know the exact life expectancies. Then the full-information benefit rule
bF (R) =
τRw
D −R (4)
also leads to a zero lifetime balance:
zF (R) = τRw − (D −R)bF (R) = 0. (5)
It is remarkable that assuming common retirement age and using the full-information
rule, Breyer–Hupfeld (2009) totally eliminated redistribution.
Asymmetric information
We have already seen in the previous subsection that the assumption of symmetric
information contradicts the facts presented in Tables 1 and 2, namely that DR was a
steeply increasing sequence. Therefore we assume now asymmetric information: only
the workers know exactly their own lifespans (or life expectancies) but the government
only knows the stochastic distribution.
For simplicity, now we change the dependence of DR into RD etc. Assume that the
life expectancies rather than the retirement ages are integers. Assume that there are
n = ω − α+ 1 ≥ 2 types, with integer life expectancy D = α, . . . , ω, relative frequency
fD, annual wage wD and retirement age RD. Introducing the government’s estimation
error of pension span
SD = D −RD −M(RD),
the type-specific balance is
zND = τRD wD−(D−RD)
τRD wD
M(RD)
= (M(RD)−D+RD)bN (RD) = −SD bN (RD). (6)
In words, the NDC-lifetime balance is the product of the negative of estimation error
and the corresponding benefit.
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To obtain analytical results, we must make various assumptions. From now on we
number our assumptions as A1, A2 etc.
We assume that the retirement age is a weakly increasing function of the life ex-
pectancy:
RD ≤ RD+1, D = α, α+ 1, . . . , ω − 1. (A1)
Additionally we also assume that the annual wage is a weakly increasing function of
the life expectancy:
wD ≤ wD+1, D = α, α+ 1, . . . , ω − 1. (A2)
A1–A2 are acceptable from a logical as well as an empirical point of view. A simple
consequence of A1–A2, M(RD) ≥M(RD+1) and (2) is that the benefits are increasing
with life expectancy: bND ≤ bND+1.
In harmony with Tables 1 and 2, we also assume the existence of a positive in-
teger D˜ such that for a life expectancy lower/higher than D˜, the estimation error is
negative/positive:
SD < 0 if D ≤ D˜ and SD ≥ 0 if D > D˜. (A3)
Due to (6), the lifetime balances of the shorter/longer lived are positive/negative:
zND > 0 if D ≤ D˜ and zND ≤ 0 if D > D˜. (7)
Strengthening (A3), we may assume that the estimation error is also an increasing
fraction of the life expectancy. This assumption implies that the retirement age stays
away from the life expectancy, i.e. Rω ¿ ω. (For example, in the US, Rω = 70 years.)
Sα < · · · < SD˜ < 0 ≤ SD˜+1 < · · · < Sω. (A3∗)
We can now formulate
Theorem 1. a) Under A1–A3*, the lifetime balance zND of the longer lived is either
negative or zero and decreasing with life expectancy D:
0 ≥ zN
D˜+1
> . . . > zNω . (8a)
b) If, in addition to a), the wages and the retirement ages are both type-invariant,
then the lifetime balance zND of the shorter lived is positive and decreasing with life
expectancy D:
zNα > · · · > zND˜−1 > zND˜ > 0. (8b)
Proof. a) Considering the longer lived, by A3*, the first factor of zND is negative
and decreasing; by A1–A2, the second factor is positive and increasing, therefore their
product is negative and decreasing.
b) If wD and RD are invariant, then the benefit bND is also invariant, therefore z
N
D is
proportional to SD, hence A3* applies.
Remarks. (i) A3* trivially holds for the primitive approach when SD = D −D∗.
(ii) Also, A3* trivially holds if the retirement age is type-invariant: RD ≡ R∗, when
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SD = D−R∗−M(R∗). (iii) Note that without assuming constant wages and retirement
ages, (8b) cannot be proved but we will return to it in Theorem 3.
Example 1. As a simple illustration, we consider the continuously uniform lifespan
distribution, where the distribution function is
F (x) =
x− α
ω − α, α ≤ x ≤ ω.
It is also assumed that the adult retirement age is a homogeneous linear function of the
adult life expectancy: R(D) ≡ ρD, where 1/2 < ρ < 1. Following Banya´r’s critique, we
assume that the earliest exit precedes the latest retirement: α < ρω. Then the average
life expectancy is
D∗ =
α+ ω
2
;
while the remaining life expectancy is
M(A) = D∗ −A if 0 ≤ A < α and M(A) = 1
2
(ω −A) if α < A ≤ ω.
Consequently, introducing the switching point DS = ρ−1α of M(A), the estimation
error is
S(D) = D−D∗ if α ≤ D ≤ DS and S(D) = 12[(2− ρ)D− ω] if DS < D ≤ ω.
Note that D˜ = D∗ and A3 as well as A3* holds.
We can now turn to the sign of the average balance:
z∗ =
ω∑
D=α
fD zD. (9)
To generalize our earlier result on the deficit in the NDC scheme (Theorem 3 of
Simonovits, 2003), we must look for a further sufficient condition. We propose the
following; the earning-weighted average of the conditional estimation errors is either
positive or zero:
s =
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD ≥ 0. (A4)
Returning to the original model, where SD = D − D∗ and wD ≡ 1, s = 0. If the
earnings were constant (A2o) and the lifespan distribution were uniform (Example 1),
then A4 would not hold: s < 0. But we shall see in Table 3 below that a slight rise in
the wage–lifespan function would make A4 valid. Anyway, for type-invariant retirement
ages, A4 is not only a sufficient but a necessary condition for z∗N ≤ 0. In summary, A4
seems to be satisfactory.
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Theorem 2. If A1–A4 hold, then the average NDC-balance is negative: z∗N < 0
except if the retirement age is type-invariant: RD ≡ R∗ and if s = 0 holds, then z∗N = 0.
Proof. Inserting zND s [(6)] into z
∗ [(9)] and using notation bND = b
N (RD) = βNDwD,
the NDC balance
z∗N = −
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD β
N
D (10)
can be estimated from above. Note that the replacement rates
βND =
τRD
M(RD)
form a weakly increasing sequence. By A3, for D ≤ D˜, SD < 0 and for D > D˜, SD ≥ 0.
Cutting z∗N into two at D˜, the first subsum contains positive products, while the second
does negatives. Inequalities
βND ≤ βND˜ for D ≤ D˜ and βND ≥ βND˜ for D > D˜
and A4 imply
z∗N ≤ −
ω∑
D=α
fD β
N
D˜
SD wD = −βND˜
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD ≤ 0.
If Rα < Rω (i.e. βNα < βNω ) or s < 0, then z∗N < 0.
Of course, the resulting deficit needs to be eliminated, i.e. by suitably reducing the
contribution rate τ to τˆ(< τ) in the corresponding balanced NDC-formula:
bˆN (RD) =
τˆRD wD
M(RD)
. (11)
Note that we neglected the unfavorable reaction of the adjustment on the retirement
ages.
At this point we must admit that our modeling of asymmetric information is still
inadequate: we assume that the government knows RD but does not know D. Similarly,
the incorporation of wage heterogeneity enables the government to infer D from wD.
The best justification for these inadequacies is as follows: in reality, there are shorter
lived with lower labor disutility and longer lived with higher labor disutility who retire
at the same age. Similarly, those who die at age D may have earned various wages.
4. Regular benefit–retirement age schedules
We want to show that Theorem 1 can be generalized from constant wages and retire-
ment ages and the NDC scheme to variable wages and retirement ages and some other
schedules, called regular. This way we reformulate Eso˝ et al. (2011, Theorem 1) from
common to increasing earnings (in A2). Therefore our critique of the NDC system is
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addressed not against redistribution per se but its excessive degree. We leave open
whether the system is balanced or not. Before entering the discussion, we present an
(irregular) example without any redistribution.
Example 2. The case where there is no redistribution. Let the replacement rate be
type-invariant: bD = βwD (β > 0) and let the (adult) retirement age be proportional
to the (adult) life expectancy: RD ≡ ρD (1/2 < ρ < 1). For a balanced system (where
τρ = β(1− ρ)), each type’s lifetime balance is zero:
zD = τwDρD − βwD(1− ρ)D = 0, D = α, . . . , ω.
This rule, however, eliminates any incentives: it does not charge any deduction for early
retirement and does not pay any reward for later retirement.
We define now the concept of regular schedule (and drop superscript N) for (bD) by
additional assumptions A1* and A5.
The induced increase in the retirement age RD is nonnegative and less than or equal
to the ratio of the D’s benefit bD to the sum of the contribution τwD and the same
benefit:
0 ≤ ∆RD ≤ bD
τwD + bD
, D = α . . . , ω − 1. (A1∗)
We also assume that the difference ratio of the benefit to the wage is at least as large
as the ratio of the next retirement age to the next actual pension span:
∆bD
∆wD
≥ RD+1
D + 1−RD+1 , D = α . . . , ω − 1. (A5)
The upper bound on ∆RD in A1* has no clear economic content but it is worth
substituting the NDC benefits (2) into (A1*). Indeed, (A1*) becomes
∆RND ≤
RD
M(RD) +RD
< 1. (A1∗N)
Only its relaxation into ∆RD < 1 is a natural requirement. Indeed, why should type
D + 1 work at least one year longer than type D just because he is going to live one
year longer?
(A5) on the benefit–wage difference ratio is even more difficult to interpret. In
Diamond (2003) and Eso˝ et al. (2011), the wage was type-independent, therefore (A5)
was automatically satisfied. A5 only means that the type-dependent wage increases
much less with the life expectancy than the benefit does. For example, if RD ≡ ρD,
then A5 states that the difference ratio should be at least ρ/(1− ρ) ≥ 1.
Theorem 3. a) Under A1*, A2 and A5, for any regular schedule, the lifetime
balance is a weakly decreasing sequence of the life expectancy:
zα ≥ · · · ≥ zD ≥ zD+1 ≥ · · · ≥ zω. (12)
b) If the system is balanced, then there exists an age Dˆ such that
zDˆ ≥ 0 ≥ zDˆ+1.
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Proof. a) Starting from zD+1 = (τwD+1 + bD+1)RD+1 − bD+1(D + 1), we shall
arrive to zD by increases. Introducing bD+1 = bD +∆bD and wD+1 = wD +∆wD,
zD+1 = [τ(wD +∆wD) + bD +∆bD]RD+1 − (bD +∆bD)(D + 1)
= (τwD + bD)RD+1 − bD(D + 1) + [τ∆wDRD+1 −∆bD(D + 1−RD+1)].
By A5, the third term in [ ] is negative or zero, therefore we can drop it. Introducing
also RD+1 = RD +∆RD, the difference between the first and the second terms can be
estimated by (A1*) as
zD+1 ≤ (τwD + bD)RD+1 − bD(D + 1) = zD + (τwD + bD)∆RD − bD ≤ zD.
b) Trivial.
5. Numerical illustrations
Different pension rules imply different retirement ages, and this should be taken into
account in the comparisons (cf. Eso˝ et al., 2011). Here we only display two simple
numerical examples, illustrating the balanced and the compressed NDC systems, re-
spectively without taking into account their impact on the choice of retirement ages.
We use the simplest analytical lifespan distribution function, namely the uniform
one in Example 1. We shall use α = 42 and ω = 72 years, omitting the 21 years of
childhood. (In other words, people die between ages 63 and 93 years.) Furthermore, we
assume a linear retirement age–lifespan function R ≡ 2D/3 and a linear wage–lifespan
function wi = wα + δ(i − α) such that the expected wage is equal to 1, for wα = 0.9,
implying δ = 0.0066.... We apply τ = 0.3.
We provide useful aggregate statistics on the balanced NDC scheme, denoting by E
the expectations: ED = 57 years, Ew = 1.00, ER = 38 years, Eb = 0.558, Ez = 0,
Dz = 4.8 and s = −0.007. (We have chosen the minimal wage wα so high that s ≤ 0
just holds.) To eliminate the deficit, the benefits were proportionally reduced by 18.7
percent by choosing τˆ = 0.244 in (11).) The size of the corresponding standard deviation
can only be judged by comparison to the second simulation.
The first column of Table 3 displays the life expectancies. The next two columns
provide the type-specific benefits and balances for the balanced NDC scheme, respec-
tively. Note that the shortest lived’s annual benefit is quite low: about 34 percent of
the lowest net wage, while the longest lived’s annual benefit is quite high: about 140
percent of the highest net wage. The lifetime balances are decreasing, starting from
higher than 5.1 years own wage and ending with lower than –9.1 years own wage.
Turning to the compressed NDC scheme, we dampen the incentives of original NDC
benefit function by taking only its power θ, where 0 < θ < 1 and multiply it by an
appropriate constant (b∗)1−θ (Simonovits, 2003):
bD = (bND)
θ(b∗)1−θ, (13)
where θ = 0.5 and b∗ = 0.527, making the expected lifetime balance zero. We renounce
the discussion of the incentive effect on retirement ages.
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The aggregate statistics of the compressed NDC scheme are as follows: ER = 38
years, Eb = 0.501, Ez = 0.05 and Dz = 2.166. The size of the corresponding standard
deviation is only 45% of the balanced one, a great improvement.
The last two columns of Table 3 display the type-specific benefits and lifetime bal-
ances of the compressed run. Note that the shortest lived’s annual benefit is quite low
but higher than originally: about 59 percent of the lowest net wage, while the longest
lived’s annual benefits are quite high but much less than before: about 108 percent of
the highest net wage. The lifetime balances are still decreasing but much compressed,
starting from 2.6 years surplus and ending with 3.8 years deficit. The lifetime balance
again decreases with life expectancy.
Table 3. Outcomes for original and compressed NDC schemes
Life Balanced Lifetime Compressed Lifetime
expectancy N-benefit N-balance M-benefit M-balance [year]
D bˆND zˆ
N
D b
M
D z
M
D
42 0.212 4.579 0.371 2.371
45 0.250 4.523 0.402 2.250
48 0.295 4.307 0.436 2.046
51 0.348 3.881 0.474 1.740
54 0.412 3.175 0.515 1.307
57 0.490 2.090 0.562 0.716
60 0.588 0.480 0.616 –0.080
63 0.713 –1.878 0.679 –1.145
66 0.816 –3.964 0.726 –1.974
69 0.936 –9.964 0.777 –2.974
72 1.078 –10.032 0.834 –4.177
Remark. bˆND from (11) and b
M
D from (13). Except for column 1, the date are given
in terms of the average wage.
At the end we note that using a more realistic distribution function (with hump-
shaped rather than constant density function), probably the distortion would be less but
not negligible. The replacement of proportional retirement ages by a more concentrated
schedule would also reduce the distortion.
6. Conclusions
The NDC scheme is basically a reasonable pension system, achieving an automatic re-
warding/punishing of late/early retirement. Nevertheless, it neglects the impact of the
life expectancy on the choice of retirement age and the strong positive correlation be-
tween life expectancy and (lifetime average) wage. Therefore this system achieves a too
strong regressive redistribution from the expectedly shorter lived and worse paid to the
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expected longer lived and better paid. We showed that qualitatively similar redistribu-
tion occurs for all regular (and other) schemes but its size can be made much smaller.
Further research with calibrated data is needed to determine the socially optimal mod-
ification of the NDC system via mechanism design. Anyway, much caution is needed to
use the NDC scheme, even if means-testing or pension credit softens its impact.
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